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INTERNET JURISDICTION AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is becoming more important in everyday life, both in
the business world and personal lives. I People log onto their computers
daily to check e-mail, track the status of stocks, and conduct numerous
business activities, such as selling, advertising, and contracting for ser-
vices and products. 2 As a result of this growing interest in and need for
the Internet, there are numerous opportunities to reach out to people in
other parts of the country, as well as in the world, simply by turning on a
computer.
With this growth of the Internet, one relatively new legal problem,
which has only begun to be dealt with, is determining jurisdiction in
regard to Internet disputes. 3 Because the Internet has no territorial
boundaries, it is difficult to define exactly what the Internet is. 4 This is
where the center of controversy lies. 5 As one case points out, "To para-
phrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is
there perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is everywhere where there is
Internet access." 6 The Internet has made it possible for individuals to
conduct business throughout the world with only a computer and an
Internet connection. 7 Courts are beginning to realize that with this
global revolution looming on the horizon, the development of the law
concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction in relation to
the Internet is in its infancy. 8
As a result of this relatively new issue, an intriguing and unclear
question arises: Can a court have personal jurisdiction over a person
based merely on that person's contacts with the state through the
Internet? 9 In a recent Massachusetts case, a judge wrote, "I cannot
ignore the fact that the medium through which many of the significant
Massachusetts contacts occurred is anything but traditional; it is a site in
cyberspace, a Web-site."lO Since there is not a physical location
1. See Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World
Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2242 (1997).
2. See Michael J. Dunne & Anna L. Musacchio, Survey, Jurisdiction Over the Internet, 54 Bus.
LAW. 385 (1998).
3. See generally Kalow, supra note 1.
4. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997).
5. See id. at 462.
6. Id.
7. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997).
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showing where the events or acts occurred, the courts must use other
methods to determine where jurisdiction lies when there is a dispute
involving separate jurisdictions. "1
This Note examines how courts in different forums have resolved
the issue of personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts with regard to
the Internet. It also assists in defining what will likely constitute suffi-
cient contacts for a court to assert personal jurisdiction. Part II provides
an overview of the history of the Internet and defines the web, along with
various uses of the Internet. Part III discusses briefly the concept of
minimum contacts in the United States federal court system and explains
its relationship to the Internet. Part IV compares the different types of
web sites and the cases that apply to the issue of minimum contacts and
the Internet. Finally, Part V discusses the courts' trends in making their
decisions and what is relevant for a finding of personal jurisdiction.
II. WHAT IS THE INTERNET?
The Internet was born in 1969 as a joint project between the
government and the world of academia, and it was originally called
ARPANET, for Advanced Research Project Agency.12 The network
linked the computers of the military, defense contractors, and university
laboratories that were conducting defense-related projects and re-
search. 13 The purpose was to maintain access through redundant links
so that research and communications could continue even if some of the
individual links were damaged because of a possible war.14 For example,
a computer sending a message from Washington, D.C. to California
could first send the message to Chicago, Iowa City, and Seattle before it
reached its ultimate destination. 15 The next time a message was sent
from the same computer in Washington, D.C. to the same computer in
California, however, it could be sent via an entirely different route.16
Today, the Internet has evolved into a system whereby all types of
individuals and organizations can share and access information through
a network of computers that operate worldwide. 17 The Internet allows
users to visit millions of different web sites and web pages by the use of a
11. See id.
12. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (providing in-depth explanations
of the Internet and its uses based on hearings and information given by experts and users of the
Internet), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
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hyperlink.1 8 Simply put, a web page is a file that has numerous names,
words, messages, pictures, sounds, and links to other information.19 Each
web page has an address, or web site, and this web site is considered the
equivalent of a telephone number or street address, using an identifying
name in the address. 20
Associated with each web site is a domain name, which is used to
direct users to a specific website just as a street address is used to direct
people to specific homes. 2 1 Attached to the end of each domain name is
one of five different domains, which are also called top level domain
(TLD) names: (1) ".edu" for education related sites, (2) ".gov" for
government entities, (3) ".com" for commercial entities, (4) ".org" for
organizations, and (5) ".net" for networks. 22 At one time, there was
a distinction between these TLDs.23 However, since 1995, there is not
a distinction, and commercial businesses can use ".net,". ".org," or
".com." 2 4
The Internet has no central point, and there are no limits to what a
person can do and see once logged onto the Internet. 25 A user logged
on the Internet in North Dakota can check stock prices, 26 learn informa-
tion regarding a university as well as complete an application to attend
that university, 27 take a virtual tour of Australia,28 retrieve information
about certain cities,29 and send a resume to a company on-line.30 That
same user in North Dakota can join a discussion group that includes
other users from all corners of the world. 31 This opens up the world
incredibly and demonstrates that the Internet truly "is unrestricted by
terrestrial borders or physical limitations."32
18. See Motty Shulman, Note and Comments, http://www.Personal-jurisdiction.com, 23 NOVA L.
REV. 781, 790 (1999) (defining hyperlinking as a process where an Internet user clicks with a mouse
on a word, picture, or image and is immediately linked to a different document).
19. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afftd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See Visual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 283 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2000).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Shulman, supra note 18, at 791.
26. See, e.g., E*TRADE (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.etrade.com> (allowing visitors to
check current stock prices and to buy and trade stock on-line).
27. See, e.g., University of North Dakota Grand Forks (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.und.
nodak.edu> (allowing prospective students to obtain information about a North Dakota university and
to complete an on-line application).
28. See, e.g., Welcome to Australia (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.australia.com>.
29. See, e.g., GrandForks.com (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.grandforks.com> (providing
information about Grand Forks, North Dakota, as well as providing links to other sites on the Internet).
30. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.faegre.com> (allowing
a resume and cover letter to be filled out and sent over the Internet).
31. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721 n.l (E.D. Pa. 1999) (explaining
different ways of communicating on the Internet via e-mail and discussion groups).
32. Shulman, supra note 18, at 791.
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There are three types of Internet web sites that exist on a "sliding
scale," and each type of web site has unique characteristics that differen-
tiate them.33 The first type of web site is a passive site.34 A passive web
site normally only provides information and does not allow for interac-
tion between the web site user and the site.35 At the opposite end of this
sliding scale are web sites in which actual business is conducted between
two parties over the Internet. 36 Somewhere in the middle, between these
two ends of the spectrum, are those sites where there is some level of
interaction but neither an actual contract nor business conducted. 37 This
classification of the various web sites often helps courts resolve the issue
of personal jurisdiction in relation to both long-arm statutes and the
analysis of minimum contacts. 38
III. MINIMUM CONTACTS IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM-
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Most internet jurisdiction cases are decided on the basis of due
process principles, 39 and as a result, it is important to be familiar with
both long-arm statutes and due process principles, such as minimum
contacts. According to Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, federal courts are authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant to whatever extent is permitted by the laws
of the state where the action is brought.40 All federal courts follow a
two-step analysis to determine whether personal jurisdiction is proper.4
First, the court determines whether jurisdiction is proper under that
33. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. (defining the middle ground as a web site where there is an exchange of information
between the user and the host computer).
38. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724-25 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing the
various types of cases brought involving web sites and Internet contacts).
39. See Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 2, at 389.
40. Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a
waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or an incompetent person,
may be effected in any judicial district of the United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located, or in which
service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the defendant in an action brought
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the State; or(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally
or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process.
41. See Steelman v. Carper, 124 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (D. Del. 2000).
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particular state's long-arm statute. 42 Once the court has determined
whether jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm statute, the court must
still ensure that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due
process under the United States Constitution, the second part of the
analysis. 43 A court must analyze each of these steps separately in order
to determine whether there is jurisdiction.
A. LONG-ARM STATUTES
Each state has been given the power to exercise personal juris-
diction, and the limits to this power are found in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Through the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the United States has defined what the limits are for the
boundaries of determining jurisdiction, and in addition, each state has its
own statute dealing with the issue.4 5 These statutes sometimes make the
limits narrower than those given by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but regardless of whether they extend jurisdiction to that allowed by
the federal rules, or limit the jurisdiction, they are called "long-arm
statutes." 4 6 North Dakota,4 7 Minnesota, 4 8 and Iowa4 9 are examples of
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."); see also Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984) (finding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the power of a state to assert in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resident of that
state).
45. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 4. Text is quoted in supra note 40.
46. See Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Mach. & Supply Co., 186 N.W.2d 449, 452 (N.D. 1971)
(referring to North Dakota's statute giving the power to exercise personal jurisdiction as a "long-arm
statute").
47. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(2). Rule 4(b)(2) reads as follows:
Personal jurisdiction based upon contacts. A court of this state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to any claim for relief
arising from the person's having such contact with this state that the exercise of personaljurisdiction does not offend against traditional notions of justice or fair play or the due
process of law, under one or more of the following circumstances:
(A) transacting any business in this state;
(B) contracting to supply or supplying service, goods, or other things in this state;
(C) committing a tort within or without this state causing injury to another person or
property within this state;
(D) committing a tort within this state, causing injury to another person or property
within or without this state;
(E) owning, having any interest in, using, or possessing property in this state;
(F) contracting to insure another person, property, or other risk within this state;
(G) acting as a director, manager, trustee, or officer of a corporation organized under
the laws of, or having its place of business within, this state;
(H) enjoying any other legal status or capacity within this state; or
(J) engaging in any other activity, including cohabitation or sexual intercourse, within
this state.
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long-arm statutes that extend jurisdiction to that allowed by federal due
process and minimum contacts. 50
By briefly examining the origins of the long-arm statutes, the
reasoning for their existence becomes clearer.51 At common law, if a
person or land was not in the territory of a court's jurisdiction, the court
was unable to assert jurisdiction over that person or land. 52 This created
the prerequisite that in order for a judgment to be valid, the court needed
physical power over the defendant, and thus the concept of physical
jurisdiction derived. 53 Problems arose, however, when a defendant was
not within a court's territory or had not consented to jurisdiction, be-
cause then the defendant could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
courts within that forum. 54
At this time, society as a whole was changing and becoming more
complex since transportation and communication had greatly im-
proved. 55 Due to the mobility of society, courts needed a solution that
would allow the citizens of a particular forum the ability to redress their
wrongs in a convenient forum, and as a result, long-arm statutes were
created to achieve jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 56 Originally
drafted to allow a state's residents to assert jurisdiction over motorists
Id.
48. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19(1) (1994). Minnesota's statute reads as follows:
As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this subdivision, a court of
this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over
any foreign corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual's personal
representative, in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual
were a resident of this state.
Id.
49. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 56.2. Iowa's rule provides in relevant part:
Every corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association that
shall have the necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, and the courts of this state shall hold such
corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association amenable to
suit in Iowa in every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United
States.
Id.
50. See In re North Dakota Personal Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1092
(D.N.D. 1990) (stating that the North Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that Rule 4 should be exercised
"to the fullest extent permitted by due process"); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d
25, 29 (Minn. 1995) (stating that courts are permitted by section 543.19 of the Minnesota Statutes to
assert jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the federal constitutional requirements of due process);
Twaddle v. Twaddle, 582 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (finding that Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.2 allows Iowa to reach jurisdictionally to the fullest extent of the outer limits of due
process).
51. See North Dakota Personal Injury Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 1092.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.; see also Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 911
(1960) (giving a thorough history of the development of the use of long-arm statutes and the reasoning
for their creation).
56. See North Dakota Personal Injury Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 1092.
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involved in accidents, long-arm statutes were expanded over time and
drafted in broad language. 57 These statutes now extend jurisdiction to
all persons conducting business within a state as well as to persons acting
outside of the state, if that action affects someone within the state. 58
Some states have statutes that do not extend jurisdiction as fully as the
limits permitted by due process, and in that situation the courts must first
analyze the long-arm statute and then the concept of due process.5 9
However, in states like North Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa, the two-step
analysis collapses into one analysis coextensive with the Due Process
Clause because jurisdiction can be exercised to the limits of the United
States Constitution. 60
B. DUE PROCESS AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
Due Process requires that if a defendant is not present within the
state in which an action is being brought, then that defendant must
"have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 61 The plaintiff in all cases will bear the burden of showing that
there is personal jurisdiction through a prima facie showing of jurisdic-
tional facts. 62 This can be demonstrated through facts supporting either
general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant. 63 General jurisdic-
tion is the authority of a court to hear any cause of action involving a
defendant; the action does not need to arise out of or be related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum. 64 Specific jurisdiction can be
asserted by the court when the action stems directly from, or is closely
related to, the defendant's contacts with the forum.65
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that first
the jurisdiction must be proper under the New York long-arm statute, and secondly,. that the
jurisdiction must also be proper under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution), affd,
126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
60. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (looking at two-step
inquiries of long-arm statutes and due process).
61. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
62. See Johnson v. Tuff N Rumble Mgmt., Inc., No. 99-1374, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12361, at *2
(E.D. La. Aug. 5, 1999).
63. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
65. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (citing
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-64(1966)).
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1. General Jurisdiction
A court has the authority to hear any claim involving a defendant
by asserting general jurisdiction. 66 General jurisdiction permits a court
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resident if "that
party can be called on to answer any claim against [the defendant],
regardless of whether the subject matter of the cause of action has any
connection to the forum." 67 The activities engaged in by the defendant
must be systematic and continuous in the forum state.68
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,69 the Court had to
resolve a situation where the state court asserted general jurisdiction over
a defendant foreign corporation. The president and general manager of
a Philippine mining corporation had maintained an office in Ohio
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. 70 From this
office the president conducted company activities such as keeping files,
holding meetings, carrying on correspondence, and using banks within
Ohio for company business. 7 1 Even though the action that was brought
against the Philippine corporation had nothing to do with these activities,
the court found that there was reasonable and just jurisdiction because
the corporation's actions were continuous and systematic. 72 As a result,
the court held that to find general jurisdiction, the court must determine
that the defendant has had "continuous and systematic contacts" with
the forum state. 73
In one of the many Internet jurisdiction cases found at the U.S.
District Court level, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
stated that it was not aware of any case dealing with the Internet where
the court had asserted general jurisdiction with its foundation being
solely the existence of an Internet web site.74 Additionally, in California,
a trial court refused to find jurisdiction based on general jurisdiction,
reasoning that if it allowed computer interaction via the web to be
66. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445.
67. Mellon Bank (East) PSFS v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992).
68. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984).
69. 342 U.S. 437 (1984).
70. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.; see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (finding that even though the company had
purchased millions of dollars worth of products, negotiated a contract, and trained employees within
the forum state, these were not "continuous and systematic contacts" sufficient to find general
jurisdiction); Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that
international publications do not constitute "continuous and substantial contacts" with the forum state,
and thus, general jurisdiction was not appropriate).
74. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (D. Or. 1999).
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defined as "continuous and systematic contacts," then there would be
no purpose to the personal jurisdiction requirement because every Inter-
net user would be subject to jurisdiction. 75 General jurisdiction has
never been found in cases dealing with Internet web sites because courts
realize that it would subject every Internet user to jurisdiction in any
forum. 76 The courts have, however, held defendants who use the Internet
subject to jurisdiction through specific jurisdiction, and as a result, in
cases dealing with Internet web sites, a finding of specific jurisdiction is
imperative. 77
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction when
"the cause of action arises directly from a defendant's contacts with the
forum state." 78 A court may exercise specific jurisdiction, or personal
jurisdiction, over a party when that party has minimum contacts with the
state or forum. 79 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,80 the United
States Supreme Court said that activities considered to be the contacts
should not be measured mechanically or quantitatively.81 Rather, the
minimum contacts should depend on "the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws"
because it was for this purpose that the Due Process Clause was created. 82
Thus, in order for a court to find personal jurisdiction based on
minimum contacts, the defendant must have some type of contact, tie, or
relationship with the forum.83
This contact, tie, or relationship with the forum must be purposeful
and intentional so that the party conducts activities within the forum state
that signify that the party is also invoking the benefits and protections of
75. See id. (citing McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at
*3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996)).
76. See id.
77. See id. (stating that the court was not aware of any case in which a court had asserted
general jurisdiction based on the existence of a web site).
78. Id.
79. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)). "Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person." Id. "[Now] due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
80. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
81. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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that state's laws. 84 If there has been no purposeful or intentional act
within that forum, then the court will be unable to find jurisdiction.85
Not only does the contact have to be purposeful and intentional, it
also must be foreseeable that this contact will result in the defendant
being brought into court in that forum. 86 The simple fact that a party
may foreseeably be brought into a different jurisdiction does not mean,
however, that the party may be automatically haled before that court. 87
If foreseeability were the only factor, then "a local California tire retailer
could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there.
. . [or] a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled
before a district court for damage caused in New Jersey." 88 Although it
may be foreseeable that a party can be brought into a particular forum,
the Supreme Court has held that without something more than
foreseeability, personal jurisdiction cannot be established. 89
Even though it must be foreseeable, if a court is attempting to
establish personal or specific jurisdiction over a defendant, it is not
required that the defendant be physically present in the forum. 90 Juris-
diction may be properly asserted over a defendant if that defendant
84. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The application of the rule of contact with
a forum state varies in the quality and nature of activities by the defendant. See id. Since the quality
and nature of activities vary, there has to be some act by which the defendant has purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state in a manner that invokes the
benefits and protections of that state's laws. See id.
85. See id.; cf Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (finding that the
defendant's circulation of a national magazine with libelous information in the forum state constituted
sufficient minimum contacts because the magazine "continuously and deliberately exploited the New
Hampshire market").
86. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980).
87. See id. at 295-96.
88. Id. at 296-97 (using examples from Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d
502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) and Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.C.N.J.
1974)).
89. See id. at 295-96. The Court gave two examples showing that there needs to be more than
just mere foreseeability for a finding of personal jurisdiction. See id. It may be foreseeable that a
Delaware trustee might move to Florida and seek to exercise a power of appointment there, but
without more activity or contacts, the Florida court could not exercise jurisdiction. See id. (using the
facts of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), for this example). Similarly, it may be foreseeable
that a divorced wife might move from New York to California with a minor daughter living with the
mother, but without more than just that, the California court could not exercise jurisdiction over the
ex-husband who remained in New York. See id. at 296 (using the facts of Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), for this example).
90. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding jurisdiction because
of a "substantial and continuing relationship" with the forum and not because of presence in the
forum). In Burger King, the defendant was never actually present within the particular forum. See id.
at 466-67. However, the defendant had entered into a contact with a resident from the forum
attempting to assert jurisdiction. See id. at 487. As a result, the Court found jurisdiction because the
defendant had established a relationship with the plaintiff who was established in the foreign forum.
See id. The defendant also had fair notice from the contract documents that he might be subject to suit
in that forum. See id.
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directed its tortious conduct toward the forum state and knew that the
effects of that conduct might cause harm.91
As a result, in order to assert jurisdiction based on specific or person-
al jurisdiction, the court must decide that the actions of the defendant
were sufficient minimum contacts. 92 The court must also determine that
these contacts were purposeful and intentional, 93 and that it was foresee-
able to the defendant that these actions could result in being brought
before that forum. 94
Internet cases have caused a great deal of conflict among the
various circuits because the level and type of Internet activity needs to be
analyzed in order to determine whether or not there is specific
jurisdiction. 95  As one author said, "Courts have not only been faced
with the challenge of deciding whether to apply new jurisdictional rules
to Internet-related disputes, but also have encountered difficulties in
properly analyzing these cases within traditional personal jurisdiction
decisional models." 96 Some courts, although in the minority, allow juris-
diction based on the mere existence of a web page, while others require a
great deal more than just a web site or web page to find jurisdiction. 97
Different views have been presented regarding solutions to the prob-
lems associated with determining whether there is jurisdiction. 98 These
views range from applying a purposeful availment approach similar to
the approach in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal
Industry v. Superior Court,99 to separately examining each case and
determining whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to support a
finding of jurisdiction.10 0 Even with the various tests utilized by the
91. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984) (stating that a magazine article concerning
the activities of a California resident, even though not written in California, caused the brunt of the
harm in California).
92. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
93. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980) (finding that
the mere fortuitous circumstance that a single automobile sold by defendant had passed through
another forum did not constitute contacts that were purposeful and intentional).
94. See Denckla, 357 U.S. at 250-53 (finding that it may be foreseeable that a Delaware trustee
might move to Florida and seek to exercise a power of appointment there, but without more activity or
contacts, the Florida court could not exercise jurisdiction).
95. See Dunne & Musacchio, supra note 2, at 389.
96. Kalow, supra note 1, at 2242.
97. Compare Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding
jurisdiction after the defendant advertised via the Internet), with Millennium Enters., Inc. v.
Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999) (finding that the mere existence of an
interactive web site did not rise to the level of conduct creating jurisdiction).
98. See Kalow, supra note 1, at 2242.
99. 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (looking at a two-pronged analysis to determine, first, whether
the non-resident defendant deliberately availed himself of the laws of the forum state, and then
whether the jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair and reasonable).
100. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding no
jurisdiction because there was insufficient minimum contacts).
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courts, there is still division in the circuits when it comes to determining
whether a court can exercise its jurisdiction, and this is demonstrated by
the cases discussed in this Note.
IV. THREE CATEGORIES OF INTERNET JURISDICTION CASES
Although the issue of personal jurisdiction based on some type of
Internet activity is new, there are three broad categories that have evolved
into which most cases fall. One category of cases finds that there is
jurisdiction whenever there is business conducted over the Internet, and
these could be considered active Internet activity.' 0 l Another category
of Internet cases includes those Internet activities that are merely passive,
meaning that there is no interaction between the user and the creator of
the web site. 102 The final category of cases are those that fall somewhere
in-between the previous two categories, where there is some interaction
between the two parties over the Internet and yet the interaction is not
outright business.103 The category and the type of activity conducted by
the defendant influences the finding of personal jurisdiction.104
A. ACTIVE WEB SITES
In cases dealing with active web sites, the court will usually find that
there is personal jurisdiction if the Internet activity involves doing
business over the Internet. 105 An active web site is one where the parties
can interact back and forth, make purchases, enter into contracts, and
conduct other activities that involve the participation of both parties,
usually in business transactions. 106 Courts usually find that there is juris-
diction, first, when the long-arm statute is satisfied, such as when there is
actual business being conducted; and second, when the defendant has
conducted that activity or business with the requisite intent to constitute
minimum contacts. 107
CompuServe, Inc. v. Pattersonl08 is considered the seminal case
dealing with active web sites and personal jurisdiction.109 In a dispute
101. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
105. See id. at 724 (giving examples of Internet activity constituting business, such as contracts
between the defendant and the plaintiff entered into over the Internet and the purchasing of products
over the Internet).
106. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
107. See id.
108. 389 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
109. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Superguide Corp.
v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 487 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (finding jurisdiction because the Internet contacts
were for the commercial benefit of the defendant and were directly related to the subject matter of
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over trademark infringement, the court found that CompuServe proved
the defendant's contacts with Ohio were sufficient to exercise juris-
diction. 1' 0 CompuServe was a computer network giant that had contract-
ed with various individuals, including the defendant, to provide access
through the Internet to different computing and information services.Ill
Patterson was one of the individuals who created the software used by
CompuServe."l 2 Patterson and CompuServe entered into an agreement
whereby Patterson could place his software on CompuServe's system.1l 3
The product at the center of the trademark action was a program de-
signed by Patterson that was intended to help people find their way
around the larger Internet network.114
The lawsuit was initiated when CompuServe began to market a
similar product with various markings and names. 115 Patterson, believing
that the product was too similar to his own, notified CompuServe that it
was infringing on the trademarks owned by Patterson and Patterson's
company.11 6 CompuServe changed the name, but Patterson continued to
complain."l 7 As a result, an action was brought in Ohio, with Compu-
Serve relying on the court's diversity subject matter jurisdiction."l 8 The
district court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction, and CompuServe
appealed. "19
The appellate court observed that the Internet was yet another form
of trends shrinking the globe and eliminating distances. 120 The court
further noted that the Internet allows anyone who has a computer with a
modem and phone line to operate an affordable international business
right from a home desktop. 121 After making these observations, the
court realized that people operating businesses remain entitled to the
Due Process Clause, which means that potential defendants should be
the suit); Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding that the
advertisement of the defendant's product over the Internet along with announcing his intention to sell a
large quantity of his product to a chain that does business in Massachusetts was enough to find
jurisdiction).
110. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1261.
115. See id. Patterson notified CompuServe in December of 1993 that the terms "winNAV,"
"Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks owned
by Patterson and his company. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. Patterson made his complaints to CompuServe via e-mail and then finally demanded
$100,000 to settle his potential claims. See id. At this point, CompuServe filed a motion to obtain a
declaration that it had not infringed on any common law trademarks of Patterson or FlashPoint
Development, the company owned by Patterson. See id. It also sought a declaration that it was not
otherwise guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1261 n.6.
120. See id. at 1262.
121. See id.
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able to "structure their primary conduct with some assurance as to where
the conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."1 22 As a result,
the court stated that the real question was whether the defendant, Patter-
son, should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Ohio
based on his activities.123
The court stressed that Patterson's relationship with CompuServe
was the pivotal point in the analysis, concluding that there was no doubt
that Patterson had purposefully transacted business in Ohio. 124 In look-
ing at the activities, the court observed that Patterson chose to transmit
the software to CompuServe in Ohio, many users gained access to
Patterson's software through CompuServe's system, and Patterson also
advertised through that system with the intention of making sales.125
Furthermore, the relationship between the parties had been ongoing for
about three years by use of a contract, indicating that Patterson intended
to continue marketing software through the plaintiff.126 These were the
relevant factors used by the court in deciding that Patterson was subject
to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.127 The court acknowledged that it
would probably be burdensome for Patterson to go to Ohio for this
lawsuit.128 However, the court found that Patterson was aware that he was
making a connection with Ohio by entering into a shareware agreement
with CompuServe, and since he was hoping to profit from this connec-
tion, he was also subject to jurisdiction.129
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 130 also involved an action alleging
trademark infringement where the court had to determine whether
personal jurisdiction existed.131 Maritz argued that Cybergold was in-
fringing on its trademark and that the violation occurred in Missouri,
because Maritz was located in Missouri.132 The court determined that
Missouri's long-arm statute reached the defendants because a tortious
act was committed. 133 As a result, the court then had to determine
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1264.
124. See id. at 1265.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. The court admitted that merely entering into a contract is not enough to establish that
the defendant has minimum contacts. See id. The court also stated that placing a product into the
stream of commerce without more would be a very dubious ground for jurisdiction. See id. However,
by taking these two factors together as well as other factors, and because the defendant did both of
these things deliberately, the court found that there were enough contacts to assert jurisdiction by
Ohio. See id.
128. See id. at 1268.
129. See id
130. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
131. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
132. See id. at 1331.
133. See id. The court looked at Missouri law and found that the Missouri long-arm statute
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whether sufficient minimum contacts existed so that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would not violate the requirements of due
process. 13 4
Cybergold had an Internet web site on the World Wide Web, with the
server located in Berkeley, California.135 The web site contained informa-
tion regarding Cybergold's new upcoming service and also included an
explanation that there would be a future mailing list.136 The plan for this
site was that if a user wanted to be on the mailing list, they would have to
provide Cybergold with their areas of interest, and then Cybergold would
create an electronic mailbox into which advertisements would be
forwarded.137
Cybergold maintained that its web site was a "passive website."1 38
Whenever anyone requested information, Cybergold would respond to
every Internet user who accessed its web site requesting information.1 39
Cybergold knew that the information would be transmitted globally, and
it also had the intent to reach all Internet users in any location
geographically.1 40 The court held that since Cybergold had made a
conscious decision to send advertising information to all Internet users
through its web site, those contacts were of such a quality and nature as
to constitute a finding of personal jurisdiction and did not violate the
defendants' due process.' 4 '
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,142 the manu-
facturer of "Zippo" tobacco lighters, Zippo Manufacturing Company,
located in Pennsylvania, brought a trademark infringement action
against the defendant concerning an Internet domain name. 143 The
defendant's web site contained information about its company, adver-
tisements, and also included an application for an Internet news ser-
vice. 144 There were three different levels of membership provided by
the news service.1 45 Once individuals subscribed, they would receive a
permitted jurisdiction over a defendant corporation. See id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500). The
statute provided for jurisdiction when there was a tortious act that had its effect in Missouri. See id.
The court also found that the Missouri long-arm statute reached acts by Cybergold because they
caused a Missouri resident economic injury. See id.
134. See id. at 1332.
135. See id. at 1330.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1333.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
143. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1120-21 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
144. See id. at 1121.
145. See id. The three levels of membership were free/public, "original," and "super." See id.
Each successive level would provide access to a greater number of Internet newsgroups. See id. If a
customer wanted to subscribe to either the "original" or "super" group he or she would have to fill out
an on-line application and also make payment by credit card. See id. The payment could be made
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password permitting the individual to read and download the different
Internet newsgroup messages.146
The court analyzed the defendant's contacts with the state of Penn-
sylvania and determined that all of those contacts occurred almost
exclusively over the Internet.147 Zippo Dot Com did not have an office
in Pennsylvania or employees or agents in the state. 148 The only way the
defendant advertised its services was by posting information regarding its
service on its web page, which was accessible to all users of the Internet,
including those in Pennsylvania. 4 9
Of the defendant's approximately 140,000 subscribers, only two
percent, or 3,000 individuals, were from Pennsylvania.150 The subscrib-
ers entered into agreements to receive the defendant's service. 151 Along
with these contracts, the defendant also entered into agreements with vari-
ous Internet providers to allow the users of those Internet providers
access to the defendant's service. 152 Two of those subscribers were from
Pennsylvania.153
The main issue before the court was whether the conducting of
electronic business or commerce was sufficient to constitute the "pur-
poseful availment" of doing business in the state of Pennsylvania as
required by the due process analysis.154 The court decided that these
contacts did meet the requirements for jurisdiction, especially since the
basis of the lawsuit was the downloading of electronic messages. 155 Not
only did the defendant intend for the users to download electronic
messages, but the defendant also sold passwords, sought subscribers, and
entered into contracts with residents of Pennsylvania.156 As a result, the
court found that it had jurisdiction over the defendant.157
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,158 Toeppen, the defen-
dant, registered Panavision's trademark as its own personal domain name
on the Internet, and it then offered to sell the name to Panavision for
$13,000.159 Toeppen stated that if Panavision would agree to this offer,
then he would not register any other Internet addresses that would be the
over the Internet or by telephone. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1125-26.
155. See id. at 1126.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1128.
158. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
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property of Panavision Corporation.160 Toeppen had already taken the
names of other companies, registered them as his own, and sold the
names to the companies for large amounts of money.161 Panavision
sued Toeppen for trademark infringement.162
The court applied a three-part test and found that personal jurisdic-
tion existed.163 First, there was an intentional act on the part of Toeppen
by taking Panavision's name.164 Second, the court stated that the brunt
of the harm was felt in California by Panavision, thereby meeting the
second part of the test.165 Finally, Toeppen knew that the harm would be
felt in California because it was Panavision's primary place of business,
as well as the heart of the motion picture and television industry.166 The
court also emphasized that Toeppen had engaged in this scheme to
extort money from Panavision, further showing that the brunt of the
harm would be felt in Califomia.167 Considering these factors together,
the court justified a finding of personal jurisdiction over Toeppen.168
In Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 169 the
court held that the maintenance of an Internet web site was insufficient to
subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringe-
ment action. The defendants advertised and sold products at both their
retail outlets, and also over an Internet web site. 170 However, most sales
were made through its retail outlets.171 Between 1994 and 1997, the
defendant purchased a small amount of compact discs from a distributor
in Portland, Oregon.1 72  In 1998, the plaintiffs received a credit
document from the Portland distributor in error, at which time the
plaintiffs became aware of the existence of the defendants, resulting in
the action. 173
The court determined that jurisdiction could only be found by
analyzing the defendant's contacts with Oregon: the sale of one compact
disc to a resident of Oregon, purchasing inventory for a distributor in
160. See id.
161. See id. Some of the other companies with which Toeppen had done this were Delta
Airlines, Neiman Marcus, and Eddie Bauer. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1321 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1322.
168. See id. at 1327.
169. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
170. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 908 (D. Or.
1999).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 909.
173. See id.
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Oregon, and maintenance of an Internet web site.174 The court ex-
amined these contacts individually; it determined that there was no juris-
diction with the first contact because the sale was merely an attempt by
the plaintiff to manufacture some type of contact with Oregon that
would be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.175 The court also
looked at the purchase from the Oregon distributor, but found that this
was merely a sporadic purchase that could not support the finding of
personal jurisdiction, unless the cause of action was directly related to or
arose from that purchase.176
The court then determined that the web site was insufficient to find
that there was jurisdiction.177 The court stated that even though the
defendant had a web site that was an advertisement and from which
people could purchase compact discs, the sales were not purposefully
directed at that forum. 178 The court moved away from finding personal
jurisdiction based merely on the existence of an Internet web site. 179
The court wanted "something more" to show that the activities of the
defendant were purposefully directed at the forum.180 Finding that the
maps located on the defendant's web site were local in nature, and that it
had not sold any compact discs over the Internet to that forum, the court
stated that the "something more" was not there.181
The court did acknowledge that this web site fell into the active
category of web sites, because by using this site it was possible to con-
duct business and make purchases over the Internet. 182 However, the
court made a shift away from the previous findings by other courts and
did not find jurisdiction merely because the web site was interactive. 183
The court said that the category of Internet contacts needed further
refinement so that it included the fundamental requirement of personal
jurisdiction. 184 This fundamental requirement is some "deliberate ac-
tion" that occurs in the forum state and takes the form of business or
other transactions between the defendant and the forum's residents.1 85
The deliberate action may also be conduct by the defendant that is
174. See id. at 911-13.
175. See id. at 911. On August 21, 1998, an Oregon resident purchased a compact disc from the
defendants over their web site. See id. at 909. This sale, however, was not entirely legitimate, since
the purchase was made at the request of the plaintiff's attorney. See id.
176. See id. at 912.
177. See id. at 921-22.
178. See id. at 921.
179. See id. at 922.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 920.
183. See id. at 921.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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directed at the residents of that forum, and the court found that there
were no sales or advertising directed at that forum.186
In Millennium, the court held that the defendant had not intentional-
ly or purposefully targeted its activities at Oregon as is required for the
due process analysis, but rather intended to target residents in its own
area through the web sites. 187 The court also found that the decisions in
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 188 and Maritz, which both found
personal jurisdiction merely on the basis of a web site, were lacking in
their reasoning.189 These cases did not assert the proposition that the
defendant's activity be purposefully directed at or have a substantial
connection with the forum state.190 The defendant had to have some
warning that Internet activities might subject the defendant to jurisdiction
in a different forum.191
The court in Millennium stated: "The possibility of such overreach-
ing jurisdiction raises the specter of 'dramatically chilling what may well
be the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-
and indeed the world-has seen."' 192 The court stated that it would not
abandon the basic principle that parties must take some action in direct-
ing their activities toward a forum in order to find jurisdiction. 193 After
extensive analysis, the court determined that there were insufficient
contacts to find jurisdiction. 194
Based on the analysis in these decisions, any time there is a web site
that can be considered active, the court will most likely find that personal
jurisdiction exists.195 A finding of jurisdiction is dependant, however, on
showing that the defendant purposefully availed himself or herself of the
forum, the claim arises out of that activity, and the exercise of juris-
diction is reasonable.1 96  Thus, if there is a web site that can be
186. See id.
187. See id. at 922. The court found that the web site did not target residents in Oregon because
the web site said "Come visit us!" See id. The web site also had a map of the location of the stores,
and there were local maps showing little more than the cross-streets surrounding the stores. See id.
The court found that, based on the defendants' invitation to visit their stores, a person could realize
that the defendants were trying to target those persons in their vicinity. See id.
188. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
189. See id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 923 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D.
Mass. 1997)).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 923-24.
195. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that per-
sonal jurisdiction clearly exists when the Internet activity involved doing business over the Internet
with residents of a foreign jurisdiction).
196. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (D. Or.
1999).
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considered active, a plaintiff must show that the defendant reached out to
that jurisdiction. 197 Further, a plaintiff must show that the activities that
resulted in harm were directed at that jurisdiction. 198 Finally, the plain-
tiff must prove that it was foreseeable that the injury would be felt in that
jurisdiction.199 Often, however, a web site will not reach the level of an
active web site, with the result that a different test will be utilized by the
courts in order to analyze the web site and Internet activity. 200
B. PASSIVE WEB SITES
Passive web sites, at the other end of the sliding scale, are sites that
serve as mere advertisements or simply provide information. 201 With
regard to passive web sites, the courts' decisions have broken into two
distinct groupings. 202 The first line of cases finds jurisdiction where a
passive web site is involved. 203 Conversely, the second line of cases
declines to assert jurisdiction where only a passive web site is involved. 204
1. Asserting Jurisdiction on the Mere Existence of a Passive
Web Site
Inset is often cited by courts to support a finding that merely
advertising over the Internet is enough to assert jurisdiction. 205 This
proposition, however, is a minority position.2 06 In Inset, the court held
that an Internet advertisement and a toll-free number for inquiries were
sufficient to establish minimum contacts. 207 The court supported its
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25.
201. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
202. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
203. See, e.g., TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 408 (E.D. Va.
1997); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn. 1996).
204. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334 (D.S.C. 1999)
(finding that in this action for patent infringement there was no jurisdiction because even though there
was an advertisement on the Internet as well as the potential to order on-line, a party had to first call a
toll-free number and set up an account before they could place orders on-line); CFOS 2-Go, Inc. v.
CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. C 97-4676 IS, 1998 WL 320821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998) (finding that there
was no personal jurisdiction because the information on the Internet was limited to contact information
and a business description); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-C-4943, 1997 WL
733905, at *9 (N.D. II. Nov. 17, 1997) (finding that there was no jurisdiction because the web site was
more of a national advertisement and as a general rule in this state national advertisements are
insufficient to find jurisdiction, and opinions to the contrary are few in number and poorly reasoned);
Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1365 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (finding that advertising
on the Internet was not a sufficient contact for the court to find that there was jurisdiction).
205. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (looking at the holding of Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Conn. 1996)).
206. See id.
207. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164. The plaintiff offered the argument that since the defendant
had used the Internet and its toll-free number to try to conduct business within the state of Connecticut,
930 [VOL. 76:911
2000]
finding of sufficient contacts by contrasting Internet advertisements to
radio and television advertisements. 208 Unlike radio advertisements
which are only broadcast at certain times, or newspaper advertisements
which are often quickly disposed of, the court reasoned that an advertise-
ment on the Internet is available continually at the stroke of a few
computer keys. 209 As a result, the court held, in direct contrast to other
courts, that advertising on the Internet constituted solicitation of a
nature that was repetitive enough to satisfy minimum contacts and due
process. 210
A similar holding was set forth in TELCO Communications v. An
Apple A Day.2 11 In TELCO, the plaintiff filed an action for defamation,
as well as tortious interference with a contractual relationship and reason-
able business expectation. 212 These actions were based on the fact that
the defendant issued two press releases and called a securities analyst,
thereby allegedly depressing TELCO's stock prices. 213 The defendant
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 214
The court viewed the case as a fairly complex question regarding
what conduct occurred, because the alleged improper conduct occurred
on the Internet. 215 The court analyzed the cases previously decided
involving Internet jurisdiction at the time216 and agreed with the interpre-
tation from Inset,2 17 that posting an Internet advertisement was enough to
show that the defendant had solicited business under the Connecticut
long-arm statute.218
The court in TELCO found that the defendants had been con-
ducting their business over the Internet through advertisements and
minimum contacts comporting with due process were satisfied. See id.
208. See id. at 165.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
212. See TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 405 (E.D. Va. 1997).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 406.
216. See id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (finding that the defendant did more than just advertise by seeking subscribers and entering
contacts); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that even
though the defendant had a "passive website" the defendant had the intent to reach all Intemet users
in all geographic locations); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that the advertisement of a night club through a web site was insufficient contact to confer
jurisdiction), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161, 165
(D. Conn. 1996) (finding that a web site advertisement was enough to find jurisdiction)).
217. See id. at 406.
218. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-41 1(c)(2) (repealed January 1,
1997) ("Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state ... on
any cause of action arising ... out of any business solicited in this state ... if the corporation has
repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or
without the state .... ")). The court in Inset found that the Connecticut long-arm statute had been
satisfied because the defendant had repeatedly solicited business in the state of Connecticut via the
Internet and the toll-free number. See id.
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solicitation.2 19 It determined that these activities could be accessed by
Virginia residents at home twenty-four hours a day and that the defen-
dants did this regularly for the purposes of the long-arm statute. 220 The
court also used a "but for" test, stating that "[b]ut for the Internet
service providers and users present in Virginia, the alleged tort of defama-
tion would not have occurred in Virginia," and as a result, the court
found jurisdiction. 221
Not many courts have followed this line of reasoning because it
holds anyone who uses the Internet subject to personal jurisdiction in a
particular forum at any time. 222 In a later case, a justice commenting on
Inset stated that "[t]he weight of case law ... seems to favor the analysis
that requires something more than a Web site that acts as a worldwide
advertisement to trigger personal jurisdiction." 223 In contrast to cases
finding jurisdiction, the next line of cases concerns actions involving
passive web sites where the courts have declined to find jurisdiction.
2. Cases Declining to Assert Jurisdiction with Web Sites that
are Merely Passive
Most courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction in cases where the
defendant is using the Internet as an advertisement device. In Cybersell,
Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,224 the plaintiff brought an action alleging trade-
mark infringement regarding the service mark, "Cybersell." 225 Both
parties wanted to use the same mark for their web site.226 The defendant
argued that the court should find that jurisdiction existed merely "be-
cause cyberspace is without borders," and any product or service that is
advertised on the Internet is intended for use on a world-wide basis. 227
The court disagreed with this premise and stated that if it did this, it
would not be comporting with the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 228 The court reasoned that it would not be fair or
219. See TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404,407 (E.D. Va. 1997).
220. See id. at 408. The court found that the finding of jurisdiction was proper in terms of the
long-arm statute because there were press releases given to the forum, as well as business being
conducted in that forum. See id.
221. Id.
222. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
223. Id. at 725.
224. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
225. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997).
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, II F. 3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993)
quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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just to exercise jurisdiction over a party whose only contact with a forum
is its web page. 229
The court in Cybersell concluded that Cybersell had not conducted
any activity via the Internet that was sufficient to find jurisdiction in
Arizona. 230 Specifically, the court found that the defendant did nothing
to encourage visitors from Arizona, stating there were no visitors from
Arizona except for the plaintiff.231 Furthermore, the defendant did not
have an "800" number. 232 As a result, the court held that the defendant
had not done anything resembling an act or transaction, and it also had
not done anything to invoke the benefit or protection of the Arizona
law.233 Thus, the defendant's contacts with Arizona were insufficient to
show purposeful availment. 234 The court categorized the defendant's
activity as "passive" and found no jurisdiction.235
Barrett v. Catacombs Press,236 decided in April of 1999, provides a
thorough overview of Internet jurisdiction. Barrett involved defamation
that allegedly occurred over the Internet through the use of a discussion
list.237 The plaintiff discovered that alleged defamatory statements
concerning him were posted on the defendant's web site. 238 He sent an
e-mail giving notice to the defendant that a lawsuit might be initiated. 239
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had made use of a hypertext
link back to the defendant's web site when she posted messages on
different listserv or USENET discussion groups. 240 All of the USENET
229. See id.
230. See id. at 419.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 419-20.
235. See id. at 420.
236. 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
237. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721-22 (E.D. Pa. 1999). A discussion
list is part of an automatic mailing list service in which communications about particular subjects are
sent to a group of people who have expressed interest in that topic and signed onto the list. See id.
238. See id. at 722.
239. See id
240. See id. at 721 n. 1. The following description of a listserv or USENET discussion group is
from ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834-35 (E.D. Pa. 1996):
24. One-to-many messaging. The Internet also contains automatic mailing list
services (such as "listservs"), [also referred to by witnesses as "mail exploders"]
that allow communications about particular subjects of interest to a group of
people. For example, people can subscribe to a "listserv" mailing list on a
particular topic of interest to them. The subscriber can submit messages on the
topic to the listserv that are forwarded (via e-mail), either automatically or
through a human moderator overseeing the listserv, to anyone who has subscribed
to the mailing list. A recipient of such a message can reply to the message and
have the reply also distributed to everyone on the mailing list. This service
provides the capability to keep abreast of developments or events in a particular
subject area. Most listserv-type mailing lists automatically forward all incoming
messages to all mailing list subscribers. There are thousands of such mailing list
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groups had numerous participants, some as many as tens of
thousands. 24 1 The court noted, however, that the plaintiff failed to offer
any evidence to support these allegations.2 42 Therefore, the court found
that it could not assert jurisdiction based on a lack of evidence as to the
defamatory statements. 243
The defendant in Barrett stated that her activities and the informa-
tion placed on the world wide web were not targeted at Pennsylvania, and
that the words were simply part of a large public debate on particular
issues. 244  The court found that the defendant had not engaged in any
services on the Internet, collectively with hundreds of thousands of subscribers.
Users of "open" listservs typically can add or remove their names from the
mailing list automatically, with no direct human involvement. Listservs may also
be "closed," i.e., only allowing for one's acceptance into the listserv by a human
moderator.
25. Distributed message databases. Similar in function to listservs - but quite different
in how communications are transmitted - are distributed message databases such
as "USENET newsgroups." User-sponsored newsgroups are among the most
popular and widespread applications of Internet services, and cover all
imaginable topics of interest to users. Like listservs, newsgroups are open
discussions and exchanges on particular topics. Users, however, need not
subscribe to the discussion mailing list in advance, but can instead access the
database at any time. Some USENET newsgroups are "moderated" but most are
open access. For the moderated newsgroups, all messages to the newsgroup are
forwarded to one person who can screen them for relevance to the topics under
discussion. USENET newsgroups are disseminated using ad hoc, peer to peer
connections between approximately 200,000 computers (called USENET
"servers") around the world. For unmoderated newsgroups, when an individual
user with access to a USENET server posts a message to a newsgroup, the
message is automatically forwarded to all adjacent USENET servers that furnish
access to the newsgroup, and it is then propagated to the servers adjacent to those
servers, etc. The messages are temporarily stored on each receiving server,
where they are available for review and response by individual users. The
messages are automatically and periodically purged from each system after a time
to make room for new messages. Responses to messages, like the original
messages, are automatically distributed to all other computers receiving the
newsgroup or forwarded to a moderator in the case of a moderated newsgroup.
The dissemination of messages to USENET servers around the world is an
automated process that does not require direct human intervention or review.
26. There are newsgroups on more than fifteen thousand different subjects. In 1994,
approximately 70,000 messages were posted to newsgroups each day, and those
messages were distributed to the approximately 190,000 computers or computer
networks that participate in the USENET newsgroup system. Once the messages
reach the approximately 190,000 receiving computers or computer networks, they
are available to individual users of those computers or computer networks.
Collectively, almost 100,000 new messages (or "articles") are posted to
newsgroups each day.
Id.
241. See Barrett, 44F. Supp. 2d at 722.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. The plaintiff had a web site called "Quackwatch," which provided information
about quackery, health frauds, and consumer decisions. See id. The web site also had a discussion
group that the defendant joined. See id. As a result of messages posted by the defendant, allegedly
defamatory statements appeared on the defendant's web site. See id. After this, the defendant
allegedly posted further statements to other discussion groups involving other medical professionals.
See id.
non-Internet activities or contacts with the forum state; therefore, it could
only look at the strength of the defendant's ties with the forum based on
her Internet use. 245 It found that the defendant had maintained two
informational web sites and that each of these sites contained defamatory
information and articles regarding the plaintiff. 246 The court decided,
however, that if it followed the rationale of Inset, it would be subjecting
everyone who used the Internet to post information to nationwide
jurisdiction. 247 The court also stated that just because information may
be available throughout the world via the Internet does not mean the
defendant has the intention of targeting residents of a particular state
with that information, thus concluding that there was no purposeful
availment. 248 As a result, in any kind of Internet-based action, the court
held that it would consider in its analysis the purpose of the defendant's
actions, and whether those actions were foreseeable and purposeful. 249
The court also distinguished the defendant's activities from other
cases, noting that she was not involved in commercial activity. 250 The
court stated that the defendant was not like commercial entrepreneurs
who usually try to avail themselves of the privileges of conducting busi-
ness in another forum. 251 Because the defendant was not attempting to
profit commercially from her endeavors, it was less likely that she ex-
pected to be brought into a forum different from that in which she was
operating. 252 Accordingly, since the defendant did not purposefully
avail herself of the privilege of conducting business or other activities
within the forum state, the court held there was no jurisdiction. 253
In summary, if a court finds that a web site is passive, it can take one
of two approaches. It can follow the ruling of Inset and find that juris-
diction exists simply because the defendant has a web site and should
know that he or she could be brought into jurisdiction in that forum. 254
However, if the court does not agree with that reasoning, the court can
follow the second approach and refrain from finding jurisdiction, and
determine that the passive web site is just an advertisement and not
245. See id. at 726-27.
246. See id. at 727.
247. See id.; see also Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (finding that a minimum contacts test is satisfied by an Internet advertisement and a toll-free
number for inquiries).
248. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
249. See id.
250. See id. at 728. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996)
(using the Internet for commercial purposes); Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717
(D. Mass. 1997) (finding that there was jurisdiction based in part on sales over the Internet)).
251. See id. at 728.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 740.
254. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
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geared towards any particular forum. 255 The majority of the courts fol-
low the approach holding that jurisdiction may not be asserted based on
the mere existence of a passive web site. 256 Whichever approach is taken,
it will usually appear to be quite clear that the web site is passive based
on the facts.257 This is not the case in the final category of cases, in
which the courts need to take all the factors into account when exam-
ining a web site that is not clearly passive and yet not clearly active.
C. INTERMEDIATE WEB SITES
The final category of cases involving Internet web sites are those in
which business contracts or activities are not necessarily being conduct-
ed, but the web site is serving as more than a mere advertisement or
information bank. 25 8 In this category, there are often other factors
considered by the court in order to determine whether or not there is
jurisdiction.2 59 These types of cases are often more difficult to classify
because there are other non-Internet contacts factored into the court's
decision regarding jurisdiction that are not related to the Internet.26 0
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,2 6 1 the plaintiff was the
operator of a New York jazz club called "The Blue Note," and the
defendant was the operator of a Missouri club, also called "The Blue
Note." 2 6 2  The defendant, King, created a web site to promote his
club.263 The site was readily available to anyone in the world who had
255. See, e.g.. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997).
256. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that this
court follows that approach).
257. See id. at 729.
258. See id. at 724-26 (looking at the different cases discussing the Internet and the finding of
personal jurisdiction); see also PurCo Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Towers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324-25 (D.
Utah 1999) (finding that the numerous contacts through e-mail, numerous visits made by the defendant
to the state of Utah, along with a desire on the part of the defendant purposefully to hurt the plaintiff's
business were enough to find jurisdiction); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34,
44-46 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding that because the company used the web site to do much more than just
advertise its business, including Internet consulting, training, system administration and network design,
the court was able to find personal jurisdiction); Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health Care
Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997) (finding that the
Internet activity in this case was carried on with the intention of creating a company having a
significant commercial impact on the state of Indiana, thus justifying the finding of jurisdiction);
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding personal jurisdiction because
in addition to the defendant's web site there was also an ad published in the Washington Post).
259. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724-26. The courts will look at other factors that are
non-Internet factors, such as travel to the forum, telephone and mail contacts with that forum, and
newspaper advertisements in that forum. See id.
260. See id. at 726.
261. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
262. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25
(2d Cir. 1997).
263. See id.
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Internet access. 264 The site contained general information regarding the
club and included a calendar of events and ticketing information. 265
The site also had information concerning ticket orders that were avail-
able to be picked up on the night of the show.266 Based on this web site
and the identical party names, Bensusan brought an action to prevent
King from maintaining his web site by alleging trademark infringement,
trademark dilution, and unfair competition.267
The issue before the court was whether by the creation of a web site
a person was making an offer to sell a product in a certain forum or state
if there was also a phone number attached to the web site.2 68 The
plaintiff argued that since the defendant's web site was accessible in New
York, the defendant should have foreseen that residents of New York
would access the site. 269 The plaintiff further argued that since this
could be foreseen, the defendant should have taken steps to ensure that
the site would only be accessible to users in a certain geographic area.2 70
The court rejected this argument, stating that "[riegardless of the
technical feasibility of such a procedure, . . . mere foreseeability of an
in-state consequence and a failure to avert that consequence is not
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction." 271 The court reasoned that
even though a New York resident with Internet access was able to gain
access to the web site and view information about the club in Missouri,
the user still had to take several affirmative steps to utilize the site and
information. 272 For example, the user would have to telephone the box
office in Missouri to obtain tickets for a show at that club, and would
also have to pick up the tickets in Missouri because the defendant did
not mail or send the tickets.2 73
Accordingly, the court held that the ability to gain information on
the allegedly infringing product did not equate to advertising, promot-
ing, selling, or targeting of the product in a certain forum. 274 The court
noted there were no allegations that the infringing goods were brought
into New York, or that there was any other activity by King directed at
New York. 275 As a result, the court did not assert jurisdiction over King
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 298.
268. See id. at 299.
269. See id. at 300.
270. See id.
271. Id.; accord Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1986).
272. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
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because there were no contacts outside of the web site that could be
construed as targeting New York as a forum. 276
In Blumenthal v. Drudge, 277 the plaintiff brought an action alleging
defamation based on a statement published by the defendant on the
Internet. 278 The defendant's actions included a web site accessible at no
cost to anyone with access to the Internet, a hyperlink to a site with the
latest edition of the Drudge report, and numerous other hyperlinks to
other sites of potential interest to those accessing the site. 279 The court
looked specifically at the following factors in making its decision:
[T]he Drudge Report has been regularly transmitted over the
Internet to Drudge's subscribers and repeatedly posted on
Drudge's web site, where it has been available 24 hours a day
to District residents; that Drudge personally maintains a list of
e-mail addresses, which enables him to distribute the Drudge
Report to anyone who requests it, including e-mail addresses in
the District of Columbia; and that he has solicited contributions
and collected money from persons in the District of Columbia
who read the Drudge Report. 280
The court also included as a factor the fact that the defendant had
traveled to the District of Columbia twice, and was in contact with District
of Columbia residents in order to receive gossip concerning District of
Columbia residents. 281
Adding these contacts together, the court found that the defendant
had an interactive web site used by District of Columbia residents, and
that the defendant also had non-Internet contacts of a sufficient quantity
to find personal jurisdiction. 2 82 Further support in the assertion of
personal jurisdiction was that "by virtue of the subjects he covers," and
his solicitation of gossip from District of Columbia residents and offi-
cials, the defendant had specifically targeted readers in that forum. 283
276. See id.
277. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
278. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998).
279. See id. at 47. The Drudge Report is an electronic publication that is a gossip column focus-
ing on gossip from Hollywood and Washington, D.C. See id. In 1996, the defendant entered into a
six-month agreement with a publisher, and upon expiration of that agreement, he entered into an
agreement with America Online. See id.
280. Id. at 54.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 56.
283. See id. at 57.
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Therefore, the court was able to find that the defendant had purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and protection of that forum's jurisdic-
tion, and that the requirements of due process and minimum contacts
were met. 284
There are also cases where one of the parties has agreed to a forum
selection clause in a contract entered into over the Internet, and if this is
the case, the court does not need to find minimum contacts. 285 In
Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 286 the court found that there were insuffici-
ent contacts based on the activities of the defendant to support a finding
of jurisdiction. 287 However, the contract between the parties had a forum
selection clause, and as a result, the court utilized this to determine
jurisdiction. 288 The court reasoned that because of the forum selection
clause, the defendant could not reasonably anticipate being brought into
a court in New Jersey, which was a different forum than that specified in
the defendant's contract. 289 As a result of lack of actual contacts with
the state and the forum selection clause, the court held that it could not
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 290 It is likely courts would
enforce a forum selection clause, regardless of the type of Internet web
site, provided that the forum selection clause is done correctly. 29 1
The intermediate web sites are most difficult for courts in determin-
ing whether there is jurisdiction. 292 The reason for the difficulty lies in
the fact that often there are more substantial contacts over the Internet
than just a passive advertisement, yet not enough for a finding of definite
contacts aimed at a particular forum. 29 3 An added problem to these
cases is that often there are more contacts not related to the Internet that
the courts need to take into account when determining jurisdiction. 294
The main criterion in this gray area is that the court will most likely
require "something more" than just contact via a web site. 295 All of the
284. See id. at 57-58.
285. See Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748 (D.N.J. 1999).
286. 49 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999).
287. See Decker, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
288. See id.
289. See id. Compare id. at 748 (recognizing that the forum selection clause should be en-
forced), with Thompson v. Handa-Loupez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that
there was a clause that looked like a forum selection clause, but that it was rather a clause that stated
that disputes shall be governed by the laws of California and resolved exclusively by final and binding
arbitration), and Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 469 (D. Mass. 1997)
(finding an invalid forum selection clause because Digital improperly phrased the forum selection
clause).
290. See Decker, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
291. See id. at 748; see also Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
292. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
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different types of cases tend to meld into each other, and the most
important consideration is whether the finding of personal jurisdiction
comports with the concepts of the long-arm statutes, due process, and
minimum contacts. 296 A distinguishing characteristic among all the
cases seems to be a movement away from the finding of personal juris-
diction based on the mere fact that there is Internet activity. 297 Instead,
the courts will analyze the actual activity of the parties in order to deter-
mine whether there is personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts
and due process. 298 In Inset, the court stated that there was a web site, so
the defendant should have known that the defendant would be subject
to jurisdiction in a foreign state. 299 Most courts have moved away from
this position, and instead analyze whether defendants have purposefully
availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in a particular
forum.300
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet has grown rapidly in a short number of years, and it is
now common for people to own their own computers, to check their
e-mail, and surf the web for entertainment on a daily basis.301 It is
extremely popular and combines different types of media so that young
and old can enjoy and benefit from its use.302 Not only do private
persons use the Internet, but businesses are learning daily that they
cannot be fully successful unless they are connected to the Internet. 303
Due to this increased popularity and growing dependence on the
Internet, attorneys need to be aware of the Internet-related issues. There
are many questions regarding how courts will distinguish between the
different types of web sites, with the result that it is important to
understand what type of jurisdictional analysis the courts are applying.
Most courts use a two-part analysis to determine the issue of personal
jurisdiction. 304 First, the court decides whether or not the state's long-
arm statute has been satisfied, and second, it determines whether the
296. See Millennium Enters. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 909 (D. Or. 1999).
297. See id. at 915.
298. Compare Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(holding that there was jurisdiction because there was a web site), with Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at
923 (holding that there was not jurisdiction even though there was a web site because of the
importance of considering other factors).
299. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
300. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
301. See generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
302. See Kalow, supra note 1, at 2245.
303. See Kalow, supra note 1, at 2245-46.
304. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Internet Jurisdiction Update,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 1999, at 3; see also Steelman v. Carper, 124 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (D. Del. 2000).
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contacts meet the standard for minimum contacts under the interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 305 It is
vital to be aware, however, that the cases are not consistent in their
holdings and do not assign the same amount of weight to various
activities. 306
"The Internet, despite its massive size, is still in its infancy. [Attor-
neys who practice in this area must] recognize that what is new and novel
today may be obsolete or antiquated tomorrow." 307 As a result, when
dealing with cases involving jurisdiction based on Internet contacts, it is
important to be familiar with both the long-arm statute of the state in
which the attorney is practicing, and the traditional principles of due
process and minimum contacts.
Lora J. Lewicki
305. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 304, at 3; see also Steelman, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 222.
306. Compare Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(finding jurisdiction based on a web site serving as an advertisement), with Millennium Enters. v.
Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 923 (D. Or. 1999) (finding that there was not jurisdiction
even though actual sales were conducted over the Internet, because the sales were not conducted with
that specific forum).
307. Shulman, supra note 18, at 808.
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